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Kirk 1
Fear plays an immense and significant role in events that are unprecedented. The Civil
War was arguably the first major conflict Americans experienced in the early years of the nation
where they faced an unmatched size and scope of violence. The violence that besieged the
country in the early 1860s, though physically ended with Lee’s surrender on April 9, 1865,
remained etched indelibly in the mental and emotional psyches of Americans. With such an
unparalleled event, the effects on the citizen body of the nation to reconcile with the war and
determine how to effectively heal can be traced through the Reconstruction years. Historians
David Blight, Heather Cox Richardson, and Nina Silber offer three major points of explanation
for how sectional healing and reconciliation occurred in the immediate post-war. Race, class, and
gender have personified the explanations for reconciliation.1
However, in more recent years, certain scholarship has evolved that deals with fear as yet
another driving force behind sectional reconciliation that deserves to be put alongside race, class
and gender. In his recent book A Dangerous Stir, Mark Summers analyzes this paralytic fear that
overwhelmed the minds of Americans in the days, weeks, months and years after the Civil War.
With an unprecedented war that challenged the very existence of American democracy, citizens
were scared of the direction the country would take when that war ended. In other words, society
was less prepared to deal with the outcomes and consequences of the war that they were illequipped to fight in the first place. The war’s meaning was not clearly seen in 1865, Summers
argues, and for good reason. Democracy had been in danger, assassination plots were formed,
and rebels were in fact jailed.2 The unknown depth of “wounds” from four years of horrific
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fighting “could only intensify the search for subversives” in post-war America.3 Fear uses a
unique strategy of manipulation, one that controls and fuels human emotions under immense
distress. By analyzing the demands for treasonous retribution against Jefferson Davis and the
calls for both his trial and execution, scholars are beginning to understand how northern fear
created an instantaneous need for reconciliation and therefore the vast differences in how to
achieve healing alongside justice become fathomable.
The Civil War was the first time in United States history where a group of states came
together and concurrently agreed to secede from the Union. The constitutionality of secession
was highly debated among the federal government, arguing against, and proponents of the south,
arguing for. Did the southern states have the constitutional right to secede? President Abraham
Lincoln fervently believed that secession was unconstitutional, and refused to recognize the
South’s claim of separation from the Union.4 Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution states
that “no state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” and is followed in Article
III, Section 3 which defines treason as consisting “only in levying War” against the United
States.5 With the South’s ‘secession’ from and declaration of war against the Union, the question
of whether such an act constituted treason was raised. Many agreed that secession warranted
treason, and following the Confederacy’s loss in the Civil War, firmly believed that those
responsible for secession deserved punishment.
Among the top ‘ring leaders’ of the Confederacy, majority of the call for treasonous
punishment focused on Jefferson Davis, the former Confederate president. With the capture of
Davis on May 10, 1865, the calls for convictions of treason became rampant among many,
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mainly northern newspapers, Union veterans, and freed slaves. Davis represented the
“quintessential wrongdoer,” a man blamed for Lincoln’s assassination, the horrid prison of
Andersonville, and, more importantly, treason.6 Gary Gallagher writes that soldiers and northern
civilians viewed Davis as the “prime traitor seeking to undo the Union.”7 Lincoln himself
expressed the main purpose of the war was to preserve the Union.8 Gallagher argues similarly;
slavery, although a large cause of the war, was not the primary cause. Northern motivation to
fight was “maintenance of the Union,” with slavery and the Thirteenth Amendment becoming
the “means to secure” the preservation Lincoln desperately wanted.9 Davis, the architect behind
the southern secession, literally ripped the nation in two, and therefore was labeled a traitor who
desired disunion and in the process committed treason.
Talk and preparation of a trial ending with Davis’s hanging quickly spread. However,
Davis never faced trial, conviction, or execution. The signing of a bail bond by New York
Tribune editor Horace Greeley and others ensured that Davis was never put on trial; instead he
was released from Fortress Monroe with air remaining in his lungs. The man who represented
secession and the four long years of war kept his life while Lincoln gave his to save the Union
equaled injustice to many. The answer to why Davis never faced trial and was hanged has
puzzled historians since the signing of his bail bond in 1867. Northerners expressed anger over
Davis and his crimes committed during the war, and wanted him to pay for the unprecedented
loss of life they believed he was at fault for. The calls for and against Jefferson Davis’s
execution depicted the emotional status of the country in the immediate post-war, those who
sought retribution for the Civil War and those who sought reconciliation to avoid another one.
6
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The United States faced the issue of treason once before in its history, in the founding
years of the nation. Benedict Arnold betrayed the Continental Army by corresponding with the
British Army to surrender the West Point Fort in return for compensation. When Arnold’s
workings with the British Army became public knowledge, he fled to New York and eventually
to England. He never faced trial for his treasonous acts of betrayal. The vehement reactions of
the colonists to Arnold were found throughout society; drawings portrayed Arnold as a friend of
the devil, one “leagued with Satan.”10 Colonists viewed Arnold as a traitor to the cause of virtue,
and were fearful their chance of independence from Britain had been jeopardized. Hatred of
Arnold stayed alive after the war, and even into the present; his name is one virtually
synonymous with treason and traitor. The lack of punishment in Arnold’s case did not allow a
precedent to be set for future treasonous acts, like that of Jefferson Davis. Consequently, the
absence of a precedential punishment for treason and the existence of a lack of punishment
against Arnold might explain why, despite calls for Davis’s trial and execution, he never legally
received sentencing.
The violence that occurred between 1861 and 1865 was unprecedented in the United
States. The sheer loss of life, of men young and old, had the greatest impact on the living postwar. The country never before faced the task of dealing with death on such a large scale, let
alone the task of finding permanent resting places for the dead. The emotional burdens placed on
the living to reunite the nation was immense; the responsibility of the people to reconcile with
and understand the dead while also moving forward as a new country proved a difficult
undertaking. The war alone proved a shocking experience. The aftermath was even more
traumatizing. With the nation dealing with new, repressed, and difficult emotions of making
10
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sense of the war and reconstruction in mid-1865, cries for punishment of the Confederate
leadership, namely Jefferson Davis, becomes understandable.
The arrest of Davis provided the perfect opportunity for northerners to unleash their
emotional anger, a combination of the horrors and sufferings of the war, and the seemingly
invisible answer on how to recover from the loss. The hostility towards Davis was easily found
throughout society. Illustrations, stamps, and newspaper articles spread quickly. Many
illustrations mocked Davis hanging from a sour apple tree, and even associated him with
Benedict Arnold and Judas, the traitor who betrayed Jesus. Davis was considered “no less than
the damned traitor Benedict Arnold,” the phrase paired alongside a picture of Davis descending
to hell where “Traitor Arnold” gave “Traitor Davis” a warm welcome.11 Some even decided to
hang him in effigy.12 Harper’s Weekly first wrote of Davis and his treasonous implications on
May 27, seventeen days after his capture. The speed of publication speaks to the emotional state
of the country; serious northern animosity existed at the end of the war and focused itself on
Davis. The article declaring the “treason of Jefferson Davis” discussed how his arrest and
eventual “execut[ion]” must be used as an “emphatic warning” to the newly rejoined
southerners.13 The unprecedented act of punishing treason in the United States, set with Benedict
Arnold, appeared to be advancing in the direction of finally creating a precedent for the future.
Such an act as secession, deemed unconstitutional and treasonous, was believed in the eyes of
the northern public to be a crime against the country. Davis surely would be tried for the “horrid
crime” of treason before he could commit anything of the like again.14
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Northern fear was also unleashed with Davis’s capture. Their unsettled fear of a “second
American revolution,” virtually a second civil war, was something many northerners wanted to
avoid.15 In order to do so, implicating Davis in the Lincoln assassination was added to the list of
wrongs. His position as leader of the secession and the supposed arch enemy of Abraham
Lincoln seemed enough to claim his involvement with John Wilkes Booth and the plot. There
was no evidence to discount his participation, after all. A dispatch from the war department
suggested the assassination plot had been given the “go-ahead in Richmond.”16 Northerners
confidently believed Davis would be “inculpated in the plot” to murder President Lincoln,
despite the minimal evidence.17
The range of accusations from northern citizens demonstrates the incredible amount of
fear and panic this unprecedented war and assassination had on society. The people wanted
someone to pay the punishment for the tragedies of war, and they wanted to single that person
out quickly. Jefferson Davis acted as their scapegoat, the man in the limelight at the time. By
focusing the blame for the entire war and Lincoln’s assassination on him, and then by calling for
his trial and execution, he became a surrogate for the rest of the Confederate leaders and citizens,
where his removal from society would hopefully rush in a renewed sense of reconciliation to the
country.
Horace Greeley, the infamous New York Tribune editor, wrote during the war that Jefferson
Davis was the “leader of a Conspiracy,” a “pseudo-President,” and a “bloody-minded villain.”18
Northerners echoed this rhetoric almost immediately after the 4th Michigan Cavalry of James H.
15
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Wilson captured the Confederate president in May of 1865.19 The war had ended, and the
perpetrators of the failed southern cause were in Union hands. Northern voices quickly called for
his fate to be determined, emphatically calling Davis’s actions treasonous, citing treason as the
“highest crime” found in the Constitution.20 Davis was the symbol of “southern wickedness,”
and represented all the Union military had “discredited – slavery, states’ rights, and secession.”21
Everything Davis stood for, in the North’s eyes, reeked of treason. When Lee, unable to protect
the Confederate capital at Richmond, surrendered to Grant at Appomattox, Davis fled to Georgia
where Wilson’s cavalry caught and arrested him. From the moment of his capture, Union
soldiers’ excitement for his punishment echoed in songs like “Jeff in Petticoats,” narrating that
Davis knew the Yankee soldiers came to “hang old Jeff.”22
Emotions still ran high in the United States six months after Davis’s capture and
imprisonment in Fortress Monroe. Harper’s Weekly published another article dealing with
Davis’s treasonous implications on November 25, 1865, writing that a jury’s agreement of
treason would only “affirm what the country has already decided.”23 In essence, a judicial
decision would not change the minds of northerners; Davis was already guilty and singled out as
the Confederate scapegoat. His execution would only calm the fears and emotions of the north.
But, would Davis’s conviction and execution cause uproar in the south? The end of the article
debates the intent of trial and execution for treason: is it “revenge or prevention” for the future?24
This evidence of the shift in rhetoric regarding Davis’s fate, and one of the first times a
conversation concerning the discrepancies found between healing and justice was initiated. The
19
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article even states as the last sentence that the “public mind [views the] point very differently,”
clearly meaning the public was not yet over the war and still saw Davis as the prime traitor.25
Horace Greeley echoed this shift in rhetoric as well in the New York Tribune nearly a month
after the arrest. He wrote in June of 1865 that the only reason to hang Davis would be if the
hanging “would benefit either the blacks or the poor whites of the south.”26 Greeley’s fear was
hanging these rebel chiefs in cold blood; he did not believe execution would help the
reconciliation process. Justice would “greatly interfere with the more important goal of
reconciliation,” or healing.27 Rather, it would cause Davis to become a martyr to the south,
essentially angering the ex-Confederates, who would raise arms again against the Union
supporters still in the south – the newly emancipated blacks.
The alteration in rhetoric seen from Harper’s Weekly and Horace Greeley opens the question
of the country’s emotional status post-Davis’s indictment. There appears to be a large difference
in the rhetoric of the people when compared to some newspapers and popular figures. Eight
months after the arrest, the Kansas State Senate passed a resolution that favored the “trial,
conviction and hanging” of Jefferson Davis, leader of the rebellion and “guilty of treason.”28 The
stance of the public had not changed since his arrest. Anger, revenge, and retribution still
remained in the northern minds. Davis, unlike Robert E. Lee, refused to “admit any guilt” or
“apologize for his actions and the cause he had led.”29 He acted as if the war had never ended, as
if the southern cause was still in existence. This apologetic refusal spilled over and gave the
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southern “Lost Cause its lifeblood.”30 Had Davis accepted defeat, the northern public might have
accepted him, his cause, and the southern people back more willingly into the Union. The lack of
confession from Davis also fueled northern fear that a second war was soon to follow. If the
leader of the traitors was to not accept defeat, what stood in the way of the ex-Confederates
raising arms again? In other words, Jefferson Davis’s negligence to accept his failed cause
hindered the reconciliation process, and, furthermore, scarred the way his legacy is remembered
to this day by Americans.
The alteration also shows a glimpse into what the larger process of reconciliation and reunion
meant to the country after the war. Initially, the tone of the nation seemed to chant ‘Hang Jeff
Davis from a sour apple tree,’ echoed in songs like “Good Bye Jeff” by Phillip P. Bliss and “Jeff
in Petticoats” by George Cooper and Henry Tucker. These phrases became popular to the public
in the immediate post-war. After all, hanging the rebel leader appeared to be the only ‘quick fix’
to the question of reconciliation and reunion. How was the nation to move forward when the
leader of the rebellion was not turned into a public example of the consequences of rebellion and
treason? Anti-Davis phrases continued to stay popular years after the war. Grand Army veterans,
meeting in Albany in 1886, broke out into “We’ll Hang Jeff Davis from a Sour Apple Tree”
towards the end of their assembly meeting.31
Based on Greeley’s changing opinion from the New York Tribune, though, the entire nation
did not continue this anti-Davis sentiment for too long after the end of the war. The emotional
hot-headedness and fear wore thin within a year of his imprisonment, as is exhibited by Greeley
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on June 22, 1866. He questions the use of “persisting in a cheat” where “nobody is cheated,”32
implying that Davis, after living in a jail cell for a year with no trial, committed no wrong and
should receive a clean slate cleared of any misdeeds. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior,
thought that Davis should be pardoned, fearful of no conviction of treason and the federal
government becoming a “calamitous” fool, one embarrassed and unable to “assert its
dominance” over the south during Reconstruction following Davis’s acquittal.33
Fear surrounded the supposed trial of Jefferson Davis that many hoped would produce a
guilty verdict, locking the traitor up until his walk to the gallows. Uncertainty as to whether there
was even enough evidence to convict Davis was the primary concern. The constitutionality of
secession, the main reason he was labeled a traitor, was still highly debated. No clear ruling had
previously been determined as to what the legal stance was regarding secession. Many held
opinions regarding the constitutionality, but doubt of whether those opinions would hold in court
bred fear of Davis being granted freedom. The fear alone that Davis might escape a guilty
sentence for treason was enough for some to give up hope or “expectation of convicting him.”34
Another fear of trying Davis was that in the event he was found guilty and sentenced to hanging,
the healing and reunion process of bringing the north and south together would be disrupted, if
not permanently damaged. With northerners already feeding their unsettled fear of a second civil
war, the conviction and execution of Davis would only intensify the possibility of a southern
revolt that resulted in exactly that fear of a second war.
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After two long years of imprisonment in Fortress Monroe, Jefferson Davis was released
on a $100,000 bail bond paid for by eighteen men, three of them “wealthy and prominent
Northerners:” Gerrit Smith, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Horace Greeley.35 The irony in those who
helped free the leader of the secessionist movement complicates the narrative of Davis’s
indictment. What motivated these individuals, all who were champions of abolition and
advocates of fair trials, to fund the release of a man many considered a criminal? The question
has no direct answer, but in all liklihood was influenced by fear. The quick and radical change in
rhetoric and action, especially in Greeley’s case, point at no other motivating factor except fear.
A year before Davis’s release on bail, Greeley wrote in the New York Tribune that “it seems to us
he ought to be [tried, and] we can imagine no reason for deferring his trial.”36
Why, then, did he contribute money to free Davis? Greeley wrote in 1871 that of the men
who signed the bail bond, no one ever criticized them for signing, “not even Wendell Phillips.”37
Phillips, an abolitionist, had spoken exactly ten days before Davis’s release encouraging others
to reject the conciliation efforts, and not to forget the lessons from the prior thirty years.38 Why
did he fall short of his own advice and not condemn those who released Davis? These
unanswered questions only complicate the already conflicting and unparalleled reconciliation
situation Americans faced in the post-war years. The fear of the unknown results of reunion
efforts, and the raw emotions that traumatized and scared society gave way to two differing poles
of reconciliationist solutions – healing and justice – both with the intent of helping the nation
move on.
35
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The contradictory views surrounding Jefferson Davis, convictions of treason, and his release
from prison with no trial opens a more in depth dialogue on the larger process of reconciliation
in terms of healing and justice, and how northerners came to terms with the war and its
aftermath. Fear, by and large, was the principal motivation behind both sides of the spectrum in
regards to calls for Davis’s trial and execution, and also to his eventual release. The war, with its
massive scope of destruction, the first in American history, almost forced the public to place
their full faith into President Andrew Johnson to lead them through Reconstruction. Johnson,
though, had a reputation of allowing his “impulsive” mind to dictate his actions, which more
often than not angered many of his fellow politicians.39 His unpredictable style of leadership put
his loyalty to the Union in question, primarily because he was unreliable. At the end of the war,
Johnson promised “traitors must be punished,” but then leniently handed out pardons to exConfederates, numbering over 7,000 in 1866.40 The considerable number of ex-Confederates
granted amnesty by Johnson practically fueled the fire of fear, alarming northerners – veterans
and citizens alike – that traitors were set free with no punishment. With the knowledge that no
punishment was even an option in Johnson’s reconstruction policy, fear became instilled into
northern minds that the war was not yet over. The unsettled fear of a second war seeped through
society and affected the ending results of reconciliationist efforts.
The approach to reconciliation through the healing lens focused itself around two notions: the
fears of not achieving sectional reconciliation with Davis’s public hanging and of a second war
erupting with Davis’s execution. These fears help explain why the ex-Confederate president was
never tried or sentenced. The struggle to attain northern and southern reunion encountered
obstacles from the start, namely the new role of emancipated slaves in society and the state of the
39
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southern economy. The nation wrestled with how to unite two economically and culturally
different sections after the war, especially after one had been victorious over the other. Popular
figures questioned whether healing and sectional reconciliation would ever be achievable if more
blood was to spill. Henry Ward Beecher argued on April 14, 1865 at the raising of the “Old
Flag” at Fort Sumter that “effective reconciliation” was a “greater priority” than punishing
rebels.41 Greeley echoed Beecher’s point that “universal amnesty” would “foster a speedy and
successful” reconciliation.42 This rhetoric speaks to why some northerners feared any type of
punishment being inflicted on Davis. Would his public execution really help the reconciliation
process between the north and the south? The slightest doubt that his death would only hinder the
healing process was enough for some to back away from publically calling for his trial and
execution. Greeley believed in a policy against “momentary gratification” stemming from “fierce
and intolerant” passions.43 After all, Davis would become a martyr to the south upon his death.
The lack of a precedent in punishing traitors also explains the hesitancy to execute him. As time
passed from Lee’s surrender and the realization that healing would be a long process set in, the
fear of messing up already made progress played into the reasoning why Davis lived.
The approach to reconciliation through justice also had two notions: the fear of not
achieving sectional reconciliation unless Davis was hanged and the fear of a second civil war
beginning unless Davis’s execution acted as a warning for future rebellions. These unsettled
fears that the Civil War was not yet over in the minds of northerners help explain why people
called for Davis’s trial and hanging. With Davis acting as the scapegoat for all Confederate
41
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wrongdoings, his removal from the puzzle of reconstruction and reunion could have made the
process easier. Davis represented the Confederacy and its failures, and if he had been made a
public example of treason, the precedent for treasonous punishment would finally be set for
future reference. Panic of a possible second civil war also fueled northerners to call for Davis’s
execution. Union veterans had just returned home from war, tired and often times maimed, not
wanting to fight another long, hard war again. Emancipated slaves also feared that another war
would break out if Davis was not to be executed. The fear of emancipation and the Thirteenth
Amendment being declared null and void fueled their desire for Davis to pay the price for
slavery and the war. Blacks, fearful the benefits they received after the war would be taken away,
were close to rioting upon Davis’s release.44 With no clear discourse of how to approach
sectional reconciliation, and the idea that national healing could only be achieved by enacting
justice on the Confederate traitors, fears of never healing and the start of a second war help
explain the callings for Davis’s trial and execution.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, society faced the task of piecing together the nation
that had almost been ripped apart. This unmatched period, soaked with incredible violence and
destruction, wounded the psyches of all Americans – north, south, veterans, blacks, and every
day citizens. The emotional trials and tribulations gave way to multiple responses on how to heal
the north and south back together. Historians Blight, Richardson, and Silber offered three strict
lenses to view the reconciliation process. However, an underlying tone that encompasses those
three lenses gives a fuller and meatier study of northern societal reactions to reconciliation.
Americans were blind on how to lead themselves through this reconstructive process. No reunion
on this scale was available to serve as a foundational guide. With no knowledge of whether
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reconciliation would be successful and how it would be accomplished, fear influenced the
actions taken immediately after the war. The calls for and against Jefferson Davis’s trial and
execution epitomize this addition of fear to memory studies. Race, class, and gender all fall
under the umbrella of fear; each explains various actions during Reconstruction that affected
sectional reconciliation. By placing those categories under a larger one of fear, the impulsive
nature of the actions are better understood. Fear adds another complex layer to the reconciliation
solutions of healing and justice, and how those answers to reunion were fueled by more than one
simple answer of race, class or gender. Ultimately, fear, in unfamiliar situations, motives people
to act politically. By studying what people called for and why they called for it in regards to
Jefferson Davis’s life, the conflicting views and paradoxical cycle of how to approach sectional
reconciliation and heal a nation after a bloody war proves that reconstruction is a process, and is
composed of more than one element that fueled the reconciliationist engine in the late 1860s.
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